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HEARING THE DEAF:  COCHLEAR IMPLANTS, 
THE DEAF COMMUNITY, AND BIOETHICAL 
ANALYSIS† 
Alicia Ouellette* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2002, Lee Larson was a single mother to two-year-old Kyron and 
three-year-old Christian.1  Like their mother, Kyron and Christian were 
deaf.2  The family’s native language and primary mode of 
communication was American Sign Language (“ASL”).3  Larson took 
great pride in the family’s deaf identity and participation in Deaf 
culture.4  Deaf culture is a tight knit social structure whose members 
share ALS as a common, visual language.5  Culturally Deaf individuals 
“characteristically think it is a good thing to be deaf. . . . [E]xpectant deaf 
parents characteristically hope to have children with whom they can 
share their language, culture, and unique experiences?that is, deaf 
children.”6 
The school Kyron and Christian attended did not share Larson’s 
enthusiasm for Deaf culture.  Because there was no room for them in the 
                                                 
† This Essay presents material that will also appear in the author’s forthcoming book, 
BIOETHICS AND DISABILITY:  TOWARD A DISABILITY-CONSCIOUS BIOETHICS (Cambridge 
University Press 2011© Alicia Ouellette).  The materials have been adopted from a chapter 
that comprehensively examines the issues of disability in childhood, and have been 
modified here to focus specifically on the issues raised by cochlear implants. 
*  Professor of Law, Albany Law School. Many thanks to Jessie Cardinale and Alaina 
Bergerstock for their research help on this Article. 
1 Brief for Michigan Protective & Advocacy Services, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, In re Kyron & Christian Robinson, No. 01-0702-00 NA (Kent Cty. Cir. Ct.-Fam. 
Div. Oct. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Amicus Curiae Brief], available at 
http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2002/10-02/Amicus10-5-02.html. 
2 Cal Montgomery, The Cochlear Implant Trial, RAGGED EDGE ONLINE, 
http://www.ragged-edge-mag.com/extra/deaftrial1.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
3 See Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1 (describing the use of ASL as part of deaf 
culture). 
4 See Theresa D. Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Gets the ‘No’ She Wants, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Oct. 
5, 2002), http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2002/10-02/GRPress10-5-02.html.  As is 
customary, I have capitalized the word “Deaf” when I refer to the cultural identity group, 
and used the lowercase “deaf” when referring to hearing impairment. 
5 The film Sound and Fury is an excellent introduction to Deaf culture.  (Aronson Film 
Assoc., Inc., Pub. Pol’y. Prod., Inc., Thirteen/WNET, & Channel 4 (UK) N.Y. 2000).  The 
film traces the stories of two brothers—one deaf and one hearing—as they and their wives 
struggle to make decisions about cochlear implants for their hearing children. 
6 Harlan Lane & Michael Grodin, Ethical Issues in Cochlear Implant Surgery:  An 
Exploration into Disease, Disability, and the Best Interests of the Child, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS 
J. 231, 234 (1997) (emphasis omitted). 
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school district’s ASL-affirmative program, Larson’s boys were enrolled 
at Shawnee Park Elementary School, which offered only an oral-aural 
program for deaf children.  Because they were unable to communicate 
with teachers, staff, or other children at their new school, officials at 
Shawnee Park Elementary became concerned that the boys were falling 
behind their peers.  They urged Larson to have her sons treated with 
cochlear implants.7 
Cochlear implants are a form of technology that allow deaf people to 
obtain various degrees of hearing.8  Cochlear implants function 
differently from hearing aids, which simply amplify sound.  A cochlear 
implant transforms speech and other sounds into electrical energy that is 
used to stimulate surviving auditory nerve fibers in the inner ear.  The 
implant is embedded within the skull, near the ear, and has external and 
internal components.  One part of the device is a microphone that resides 
outside the ear, while another part processes sounds captured by the 
microphone.  A transmitter sends the processed signals to a receiver 
implanted under the skin.  The receiver converts the signals into 
electrical impulses, which are then delivered to the auditory nerve.  The 
stimulation of the auditory nerve allows the user to experience 
representations of sound and might help the user develop spoken 
language ability. 
The degree to which cochlear implant recipients develop spoken 
language ability varies depending on the age at which the recipient is 
implanted (younger recipients are more likely to develop spoken 
language ability than older recipients) and the amount of spoken 
language training provided to the recipient.  Indeed, audiologists 
strongly recommend that recipients be totally immersed in oral/aural 
communication at home and in school once the implant is activated.9  In 
other words, a deaf child’s success with an implant depends on close 
interaction with parents for constant monitoring, feedback, and 
                                                 
7 Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Gets the ‘No’ She Wants, supra note 4. 
8 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION FAMILY MEDICAL GUIDE 1019 (4th ed. 2004); 
SURGICAL CONSENT:  BIOETHICS AND COCHLEAR IMPLANTATION 54 (Linda Komesaroff, ed. 
2007); see Nat’l Inst. on Deafness & Other Commc’n Disorders, Cochlear Implants, NAT’L 
INST. HEALTH, http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/hearing/coch.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 
2011) (providing more information about cochlear implants). 
9 See, e.g., Howard W. Francis et al., Trends in Educational Placement and Cost-Benefit 
Considerations in Children with Cochlear Implants, 125 ARCH OTOLARYNGOL HEAD NECK 
SURGERY 499 (1999) (“Cochlear implantation accompanied by aural (re)habilitation 
increases access to acoustic information of spoken language, leading to higher rates of 
mainstream placement in schools and lower dependence on special education support 
services.”); Children’s Program, U. MICH. HEALTH SYS., http://www.med.umich.edu/oto/ 
ci/childrensprogram.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (recommending that implanted children 
be enrolled in auditory-verbal therapy to achieve maximum benefits). 
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reinforcement of good oral speech patterns.  The strong recommendation 
is that families who choose cochlear implants make a total commitment 
to oral-only communication (no ASL) for the best cochlear implant 
results.10  In 2000, the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) lowered 
the acceptable age for implantation of one such device to twelve months 
old.11  According to the FDA, as of April 2009, approximately 188,000 
people worldwide had received cochlear implants, and roughly 41,500 
adults and 25,500 children in the United States have received them.12 
Although they are commonly used, cochlear implants are not risk 
free:  they cost thousands of dollars, there are efficacy problems, and 
they require surgery, which always entails risks.13  Reports of 
complications are not infrequent.  They include injury to the facial nerve, 
meningitis, cerebrospinal fluid leakage, perilymph fluid leak, infection, 
attacks of dizziness or vertigo, tinnitus, and loss of residual hearing.14  
Furthermore, cochlear implants do not turn a deaf child into a hearing 
child.  The degree to which they facilitate speech and the ability to 
understand oral speech varies tremendously from person to person.  
Children of hearing parents who communicate with oral language or a 
combination of oral and sign language tend to develop far better oral 
speaking skills than children of deaf parents.  Despite these risks and 
questions about efficacy, audiologists recommend cochlear implants for 
deaf children who cannot hear with the amplification of hearing aids.15 
In considering the school’s suggestion that the boys be implanted, 
Larson researched and spoke with people about implants.  Ultimately, 
she decided that the disadvantages of implantation outweighed any 
possible advantages.  Although she concluded that the boys could make 
the decision to get implanted when they got older, at this time she 
wanted them “to grow up with a strong self-esteem, not trying to be 
                                                 
10 See Lane & Grodin, supra note 6, at 235–36; see, e.g., Harlan Lane, Ethnicity, Ethics, and 
the Deaf-World, 10 J. DEAF STUD. & DEAF EDUC. 291, 299–300 (2005); Adam B. Zimmerman, 
Do You Hear the People Sing? Balancing Parental Authority and a Child’s Right to Thrive:  The 
Cochlear Implant Debate, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL. L. 309, 317–18 (2009). 
11 Nat’l Inst. on Deafness & Other Commc’n Disorders, supra note 8. 
12 Id. 
13 Lane, supra note 10, at 299–300; Zimmerman, supra note 10, at 318. 
14 Benefits and Risks of Cochlear Implants, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ 
ProductsandMedicalProcedures/ImplantsandProsthetics/CochlearImplants/ucm062843.ht
m (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
15 See, e.g., Cochlear Implants, BAYLOR C. MED., http://www.bcm.edu/oto/index.cfm? 
pmid=15404 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011); U. Rochester Med. Ctr., Cochlear Implant, 
http://www.urmc.rochester.edu/audiology/conditions/cochlear.cfm (last visited Jan. 7, 
2011). 
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something they are not.”16  She also wanted them to be “part of the 
[D]eaf culture,” and continue to communicate in ASL.17  The boys’ father, 
from whom Larson was separated, agreed with Larson’s decision against 
implants, which she communicated to school officials.18 
In 2002, Larson traveled out of town and left the boys in the care of a 
friend who was also deaf.  Unfortunately, the friend apparently abused 
the boys and school officials accused Larson of neglect for leaving them 
in her care.19  The state issued charges and a court found that Larson 
neglected the children by leaving them with a care provider who 
physically abused them.20  The court declared the children temporary 
wards of the state, and with Larson’s consent, placed the boys in foster 
care while Larson took parenting classes with the aim of regaining 
custody.21  The foster parents who had temporary custody of the boys 
did not speak ASL and communicated with the boys through oral 
speech.22 
The court appointed a guardian ad litem for the boys.  The guardian, 
who was in touch with the foster parents and school officials, sought to 
have cochlear implants surgically placed in the boys.23  He filed a Motion 
for Court to Order Cochlear Implants, claiming it was “in the children’s 
best interests ‘ . . . that they receive cochlear implants in order for them to 
realize their full potential in life’ and that time is of the essence given 
‘ . . . the ‘window of opportunity’ . . . is from birth through age 4.’”24 
The guardian’s petition was unusual.  Under state law, Larson 
retained the clear right to make medical decisions for her children, 
including decisions to refuse elective (non-lifesaving) treatments.  The 
boys’ placement in temporary foster care did not diminish that right, and 
cochlear implants are not lifesaving.  No state agency supported the 
guardian’s request.  In fact, the Michigan Family Independence Agency, 
which oversees the children’s foster care, explicitly advised the judge its 
policy is to allow parents to “decide whether or not a child in foster care 
                                                 
16 Theresa Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Fights to Keep Kids from Ear Implants, GRAND RAPIDS 
PRESS, Sept. 6, 2002, at A1, available at http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2002/9-
02/GRPress9-6-02.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.; Jon Hall, Michigan Judge Rules Deaf Boys Needn’t Undergo Surgery, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 
5, 2002, at A3, available at http://www.bridges4kids.org/articles/2002/10-02/Globe10-5-
02.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
20 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1, at 5. 
21 Hall, supra note 19. 
22 Id. 
23 Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Gets the ‘No’ She Wants, supra note 4. 
24 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1, at 9 (omissions in original). 
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should have elective surgery.”25  Nonetheless, the state prosecutor joined 
the guardian to argue that Larson’s decision against cochlear implants 
was a form of medical neglect, and her refusal to consent to implantation 
was the cause of a medical emergency.  After a preliminary hearing, the 
judge agreed to consider the guardian’s petition and scheduled a trial.  
She also ordered the boys to be physically evaluated in preparation for 
surgery.26 
The case caused considerable consternation within the disability and 
Deaf communities.  Activists came out in force to protest against the real 
possibility that the court would find the mother’s refusal to ameliorate 
deafness with cochlear implants a form of medical neglect.27   The judge 
heard testimony for several days in a courtroom packed with Deaf and 
disability rights activists.28  The prosecutor questioned the guardian who 
testified that the boys should get implants because they would benefit 
from the acquisition of oral language and the opportunities for education 
and employment that would insure the boys could lead a “healthy, 
happy, normal life.”29  The State’s expert testified that being deaf will 
prevent the boys from reaching their full potential because without the 
implants, the language-processing areas of their brains would not reach 
full development.  The guardian argued that time was of the essence 
because the window in which the boys would receive the most benefit 
from the implants was rapidly closing.  Multiple expert witnesses 
testified that implants are crucial for a deaf child’s language 
development.30 
Larson and her lawyer countered.  Larson testified that she made a 
thoughtful and careful decision to decline surgery for her boys after she 
considered the risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment.  The 
Michigan Deaf Association produced evidence that speech is not the 
equivalent to language and that it is access to language, not access to 
sound and speech, which ensures proper development of the brain.  The 
Deaf Association produced further evidence that sign language, a visual 
language used in the Larson home, is sufficient to allow the brain to fully 
develop.31  For example, deaf studies specialist Robert Hoffmeister of 
Boston University told the court that there was no guarantee the 
implants would benefit the Larson boys in their language acquisition, or 
                                                 
25 Hall, supra note 19. 
26 Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Gets the ‘No’ She Wants, supra note 4. 





31 Montgomery, The Cochlear Implant Trial, supra note 2. 
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that they would improve their schoolwork.  According to the research, 
“it’s all a roll of the dice,” and in most cases involving children who are 
born deaf, the benefits of cochlear implants are minimal.32 
Also supporting Larson was the Michigan Protection and Advocacy 
Services (“MPAS”), which submitted an amicus brief that framed the 
case as one about parental rights.  MPAS argued that the decision of 
whether to consent to or refuse implants was Larson’s choice.  The brief 
confirmed that Larson was not alone in her belief that cochlear implants 
were not in the best interest of her children.  That position, MPAS 
argued, is widely agreed upon within the disability community.  It also 
emphasized the importance of family autonomy: 
ALL families are special and unique, but families who 
have children with disabilities regularly encounter 
barriers that impact on the family and require them to 
form a different view of how “normal” is defined within 
their family, and how they interact with the world 
around them.  Second-guessing by outsiders is a regular 
part of that life, and contributes to the development of 
the family’s culture.  A decision allowing “outsiders,” 
including this Court, to invade the family core by 
second-guessing parental decisions about how and by 
whom their children’s disabilities will be treated takes a 
challenging family environment and threatens its very 
core.33 
The judge ultimately, but grudgingly, ruled in favor of Larson.  She 
stated, “[t]he court has no doubt it would be in their best interest to have 
implants,” but “the court has paid close attention to [Larson’s] adamant 
right to decide and not to participate in [the] after-care”34 needed if the 
implants had been ordered.  The judge stated that the law was clear that 
courts cannot intervene in parental decisions about medical treatment for 
their children, absent an emergency, and the refusal to consent to 
implants did not qualify as an emergency.35 
The Larson case is troubling.  The problem with that case is not that 
the judge reached the wrong conclusion—the judge correctly decided 
that the decision about whether to use cochlear implants is a matter of 
parental discretion.36  The problem with the Larson case is that a petition 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1, at 4. 
34 Mcclellan, Deaf Mom Gets the ‘No’ She Wants, supra note 4, at A1. 
35 Id. 
36 See infra Part II. 
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to override parental choice was brought in the first place.  The guardian 
ad litem and state prosecutor found some support for their argument 
that parental refusal to consent to surgical implantation of cochlear 
implants constitutes medical neglect in the bioethical literature; however, 
that argument ignores the evidence generated by disability and Deaf 
scholars demonstrating that the affirmative use of cochlear implants is 
ethically fraught and potentially harmful to children.  A more careful 
bioethical analysis of issues raised with respect to cochlear 
implantation—that is, an analysis conscious of the evidence generated by 
Deaf and disability scholars—shows that not only should efforts to 
mandate cochlear implants for eligible deaf children be rejected, but also 
more attention should be paid to the assumption that cochlear 
implantation is always in the best interests of deaf children. 
Part II of this essay reviews briefly the legal support for the 
proposition that parents, not courts, are the appropriate parties to decide 
whether to use cochlear implants for their children.  Part III explores the 
issues raised by the use of cochlear implants from the perspective of Deaf 
and disability experts.  Part IV contrasts the perspectives of Deaf and 
disability experts on cochlear implantation with that of various 
bioethicists, including those bioethicists who take positions that support 
the mandatory use of cochlear implantation for eligible deaf children.  
Part IV asserts that the bioethical arguments about the use of cochlear 
implants, which fail to take into account the evidence generated by Deaf 
and disability scholars, are incomplete.  A comprehensive bioethical 
analysis requires the use of a more thorough informed consent process 
for parents who choose cochlear implantation for their deaf children. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Like all parents, parents of deaf children are the primary 
decisionmakers for their children.37  They make decisions about whether, 
when, and how to treat illness or use technology to correct or improve 
functionality.  They also make decisions about whether, when, and how 
to manage the particular physical manifestations or social needs 
resulting from disabilities, if their children happen to have them.  As 
with most medical decisionmaking for children, the process by which 
parents make medical decisions for children is mostly unremarkable.  
The parents consult with the child’s doctor, weigh the risk and benefits 
                                                 
37 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602–03 (1979) (emphasizing parental rights to make 
medical choices for children, but limiting this power as a matter of law to ensure against 
erroneous imposition of unnecessary or improper medical treatment to protect the child’s 
best interests). 
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of medically reasonable alternatives, and then make the decision that is, 
in their estimation, in the best interest of their child. 
The deference given to parental decisions in the healthcare setting is 
more than a matter of convenience or custom.  A parent’s right to make 
medical decisions for his or her child is protected by the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.38  This right is not absolute, but it 
is well-established.39  So long as parents are fit, “there will normally be 
no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family 
to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions 
concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”40  The constitutional 
protection afforded fit parents clothes them with a presumption that 
they “act in the best interests of their children”41 in making choices, 
including medical choices, for their children.42  The presumption that 
parents act in their child’s best interests effectively shields most parental 
decisions about a child’s health care from scrutiny or limitation.  
Although a court may occasionally override a parent’s decision to refuse 
treatment if the choice puts the child’s health or life at risk,43 courts 
almost never intervene when a parent chooses a medically approved 
alternative to treat a child.44  Thus, the law generally leaves the tough 
decisions to parents. 
                                                 
38 Id. 
39 See id. at 602 (finding “a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult 
decisions,” and that “natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of 
their children,” but also that this presumption only exists “absent a finding of neglect or 
abuse”); see also Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us [the Court] 
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents . . . .”). 
40 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68–69 (2000); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 602 (stating 
that “our constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is ‘the mere 
creature of the State’” (quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925))).  Where a 
parent is deemed unfit, or neglectful, the state may intervene more freely.  See, e.g., In re 
Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918, 919 (N.Y. 1972) (ordering that a child undergo facial surgery and 
receive blood transfusions despite the mother’s religious objection). 
41 Parham, 442 U.S. at 602. 
42 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68–69. 
43 See, e.g., Jehovah’s Witnesses v. King Cnty. Hosp. Unit No. 1 (Harborview), 278 F. 
Supp. 488, 505 (W.D. Wash. 1967), aff’d per curiam, 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (overriding parental 
refusal to provide blood transfusion where death would result without the transfusion); 
Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1067 (Mass. 1978) (ordering a child to undergo 
chemotherapy over the parents’ objections because the treatment had inconsequential side 
effects and would save the child from certain death within months). 
44 See, e.g., In re Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1014 (N.Y. 1979) (holding that the court 
would not interfere with parents’ decision to forgo conventional chemotherapy for their 
eight-year-old son who suffered from Hodgkin’s disease and instead treat him with laetrile 
and a special diet); In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765, 783 (Wash. 1942) (holding that a mother was 
free to refuse surgery to remove her child’s deformed arm, despite the recommendation by 
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With respect to cochlear implantation, no court has overridden a 
parent’s refusal to consent to a medical recommendation for 
implantation.  In light of the strong deference given to parental choice 
over medical decisionmaking for children, it is unlikely that a court will 
override a parent’s refusal anytime soon; if it did, it is unlikely that the 
decision would be sustained on appeal.  That said, the fact of legal 
intervention in Lee Larson’s case, the apparent approval of the use of 
cochlear implants in children shown by judges in cases involving the 
custody of children,45 and the strong recommendations by medical 
professionals that eligible children be implanted, suggests the real 
possibility of future cases or proposals for legislation or regulation 
mandating the use of cochlear implants for eligible deaf children.  Such 
proposals would meet fierce opposition from the Deaf and disability 
communities. 
III.  VIEWS ON THE CASE OF LEE LARSON’S BOYS AND COCHLEAR 
IMPLANTATION FROM THE DEAF AND DISABILITY COMMUNITIES 
Deaf and disability advocates came together in fierce and unanimous 
support of Lee Larson.  The legal petition to require implants threatened 
to make a reality what the disability and Deaf communities had long 
feared:  that the medical view of disability would take root in law.  If the 
petition had been granted, the court’s decision would have created legal 
precedent deeming a parent’s failure to ameliorate traits like deafness to 
be medical neglect, based on alleged “proof” that individuals with 
disabilities need medical fixes to participate meaningfully in society.46 
The notion that deafness is a defect that needs fixing runs directly 
counter to beliefs and teachings of the Deaf and disability communities.47  
                                                                                                             
two physicians that it should be removed for the child’s health, because both courses of 
action entailed risk). 
45 See In re K.S., 512 N.W.2d 817, 819 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (citing the fact that a child was 
a candidate for cochlear implantation but had not been implanted was relevant in 
determining the child’s best interests in an abuse case); see also J.J. v. Smith, 31 So. 3d 1271, 
1272 (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (noting a mother’s resistance to cochlear implants for her child, 
and the foster parents’ support for cochlear implants, as a relevant factor favoring retention 
of custody by the foster parents). 
46 See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1, at 13–14 (explaining that cochlear implants 
represent a nonemergency and elective procedure, such that parents are not neglecting 
their children if not providing this service); see also Montgomery, Ripples, A Tide, An Ocean, 
supra note 27 (explaining that if the petition were granted it would set a precedent that 
would have a significant impact on parents of children with disabilities in the future). 
47 For more information on Deaf culture, see Lane, supra note 10.  See also, e.g., Margaret 
Usha D’Silva et al., Deaf is Dandy:  Contrasting the Deaf and Hearing Cultures, 13 
INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 111 (2004) (describing the Deaf Culture and the pride of 
members who feel they are part of a distinct group); Tingting Gao, A Neglected Culture:  
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Disability scholars and activists reject the notion that the problem of 
disability is located in the individual whose body deviates from species 
normal.48  The problem, assert the scholars, lies in society’s failure to 
accommodate all its members.  The solution to the problem of disability, 
under this view, is not to modify the person with the physical difference, 
but to make social, legal, educational, or other accommodations to 
ensure full participation in society.49  Indeed, disability and Deaf scholars 
often use the example of deafness on Martha’s Vineyard, an island off 
the coast of Massachusetts, to make the point that overcoming social 
barriers to participation in the life of a community can in fact eliminate 
the disabling aspects of impairment.  Historically, hereditary deafness 
was so prevalent on Martha’s Vineyard that everyone spoke sign 
language.50  As a result, the Deaf were fully integrated and successful in 
community life.  Deaf islanders were not identified as a distinct group by 
other islanders, and they were equally successful in terms of work and 
social lives.  The one exception was with respect to school, where the 
Deaf children tended to outperform hearing children.51  The lesson Deaf 
and disability experts take from the experience of Martha’s Vineyard is 
that deafness is not disabling in a society that appreciates difference and 
makes a deliberate effort to fully include people of different abilities. 
This social model of disability argument is clearly evident in activist 
Cal Montgomery’s response to Lee Larson’s case: 
                                                                                                             
How Cochlear Implants Affect Deaf Children’s Self-Esteem, 6 DIAGLOGUES@RU 79, 87 (2007), 
available at http://dialogues.rutgers.edu/vol_06/essays/documents/gao.pdf (discussing 
the effect of the cochlear implant on the Deaf community); Claire L. Ramsey, Ethics and 
Culture in the Deaf Community Response to Cochlear Implants, 21 SEMINARS HEARING 75 (2000) 
(explaining how the Deaf community believes it is not a defect that needs to be corrected); 
Claire L. Ramsey, What Does Culture Have to Do with the Education of Students Who Are Deaf 
or Hard of Hearing?, in LITERACY AND DEAF PEOPLE:  CULTURAL AND CONTEXTUAL 
PERSPECTIVES 47 (Brenda Jo Brueggemann ed., 2004) (explaining the reaction of the Deaf 
community to cochlear implants and the effects it will have on implanted children); Robert 
Sparrow, Defending Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear Implants, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 135 (2005) 
(discussing the concept of deafness as a culture). 
48 Gareth Williams, Theorizing Disability, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, at 124 
(Gary L. Alberch et al. eds., 2001); THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER, passim, (Lennard J. 
Davis ed., 2d ed. 2006). 
49 Michelle Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disability Beyond Stigma:  Social Interaction, 
Discrimination, and Activism, 44 J. SOC. ISSUES 3 (1988); Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of 
Disability:  Perspective of the Disability Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 352 
(2000); Laura L. Rovner, Disability, Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1043–44 & n.4 
(2004) (citing Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability:  Perspective of the Disability 
Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 352–53 (2000)); Richard Scotch, Understanding 
Disability Policy, 22 POL’Y STUD. J. 170, 172 (1994). 
50 See generally NORA ELLEN GROCE, EVERYONE HERE SPOKE SIGN LANGUAGE:  
HEREDITARY DEAFNESS ON MARTHA’S VINEYARD (1985). 
51 Id. at 78. 
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I am certain that if all participants in the case viewed 
deafness as just another kind of diversity, the situation 
would never have arisen. 
 
If the boys’ present and future disadvantages were 
attributed to our hearing-dominated society rather than 
to their own deafness (and their deaf parents’ acceptance 
of their deafness), teaching them pride in who they are 
and the skills to struggle would make more sense.  Many 
people who do hold the institutions of the hearing 
majority responsible (including some who regard 
cochlear implants as a good thing in some cases) are 
vehemently opposed to [the state expert’s] position. 
 
But because the people who brought the case forward 
blame these disadvantages on the boys’ inability to hear 
rather than on society’s insistence on hearing as a 
prerequisite to full membership, cochlear implants are 
seen by many people as a solution to disability.  
Denying the children implants looks like condemning 
them to a lesser life.52 
Another activist explained: 
The medical establishment has continually told us that 
being Deaf is a tragedy.  It refuses to admit that 
American Sign Language is wholly sufficient to allow 
the development of the language center of a deaf child’s 
brain and to allow the deaf child to develop full 
linguistic and cognitive competence, given each 
individual’s potential.  It refuses to admit that there are 
viable options other than a cochlear implant.53 
Indeed, cochlear implants are particularly controversial within the 
Deaf community.  Although many deaf adults choose implants for 
themselves and their children, many others, especially Deaf activists and 
their supporters, vehemently oppose their use in all cases.  The 
arguments against cochlear implants vary.  Some argue that there is an 
intrinsic value in being deaf.  They view deafness as a defining feature of 
                                                 
52 Montgomery, The Cochlear Implant Trial, supra note 2 (emphasis omitted). 
53 2002 Grand Rapids Cochlear Implant Case, EQUAL ACCESS COMM., INC., (Oct. 4, 2002), 
http://www.equalaccesscommunication.com/2002GrandRapidsRally/index.htm. 
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identity and an essential component of personhood.  In their view, using 
implants deprives children of that essential piece of themselves.  Under 
this view, denying children their deafness deprives them of the key to 
entry into a rich culture, ripe with language, arts, and tradition.54  This 
argument often compares deafness to other characteristics central to 
identity such as race, gender, or sexual orientation.  Consider, for 
example, this comment, made by a former president of the National 
Association of the Deaf: 
I’m happy with who I am . . . and I don’t want to be 
‘fixed.’  Would an Italian-American rather be a WASP?  
In our society everyone agrees that whites have an easier 
time than blacks.  But do you think a black person 
would undergo operations to become white?55 
Other opponents of cochlear implants argue that treating deafness as 
an illness needing a cure is insulting and demeaning to the Deaf because 
of its message that the Deaf are of lesser worth than the hearing.  Others 
argue that widespread use of cochlear implants constitutes a form of 
cultural genocide.56  For example, Harlan Lane argues that 
[w]hile surgical programs that implant large numbers of 
Deaf children do not have as their intent the destruction 
of Deaf-World culture, both the U.N. Declaration [of the 
Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities] and the Convention 
[on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide] express humankind’s interest in preserving 
and fostering minority languages and cultures and thus, 
once the minority language and culture of the Deaf-
World is recognized, alert us to the conflict of values 
arising from those surgical programs.57 
                                                 
54 See, e.g., Lane, supra note 10, at 292–94 (describing how the “Deaf-World” has a rich 
history, which has been reported in books, films, and more); Lane & Grodin, supra note 6, 
at 234–35 (explaining how Deaf parents like to have children who can share their culture 
and experiences); Sparrow, supra note 47, at 136 (asserting that the cochlear implant 
technology is an attack on Deaf culture). 
55 Edward Dolnick, Deafness as Culture, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1993, at 38, available at 
http://gallyprotest.org/atlantic_monthly.pdf (quoting Roslyn Rosen, former President of 
the National Association of the Deaf). 
56 See, e.g., Sparrow, supra note 47, at 135–36 (arguing that finding a “cure” for deafness 
constitutes genocide of the deaf community). 
57 Lane & Grodin, supra note 6, at 238 (emphasis omitted). 
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The arguments against cochlear implants have not convinced most 
parents to forgo implantation for their children.  Most deaf children are 
born to hearing parents,58 and most of those parents choose implants for 
children who are eligible.59  Many deaf adults also choose implants for 
themselves and their deaf children.  In fact, the two deaf parents of a 
deaf child—whose decision against cochlear implants for their daughter 
Heather was the subject of the award winning documentary Sound and 
Fury—ultimately had a change of heart and got implants not just for 
their daughter, but also for another deaf child and themselves.60 
Despite the internal tension about cochlear implantation within the 
Deaf community—some members of the Deaf and disability 
communities would argue against cochlear implants in all cases and 
others elect implants for themselves and their children—there is 
widespread agreement on one thing:  a decision to use cochlear implants 
is ethically fraught and should be made with great care and caution.  
Deaf and disability experts urge that anyone considering the use of 
implants for their children be advised, in no uncertain terms, not only of 
the known risks of implantation (nerve damage, infection, meningitis, 
even death) but also the cultural and psychological costs.61  For example, 
Clair Ramsey cautions, “[i]f we take the child as a whole person rather 
than ‘a broken ear with a child attached’ we are obligated to consider the 
effects of an implant on the child’s psychological development 
(especially identity formation), educational progress, and social life.”62  
Thus, parents should have reasonable expectations.  Cochlear implants 
will not make congenitally deaf children into hearing children.  Parents 
“should be made aware that an implant may augment the patient’s 
ability to detect sound, but that the patient will still have severely 
impaired hearing” and limited speech proficiency.63  Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, parents must be advised that implanted 
children “often find themselves in limbo” as they become independent of 
their families.64  “[T]hey are not deaf people because they do not sign.  
                                                 
58 Quick Statistics, NAT’L INST. ON DEAFNESS & OTHER COMM. DISORDERS, 
http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/health/statistics/quick.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011) (“Nine 
out of every 10 children who are born deaf are born to parents who can hear.”). 
59 See, e.g., Gao, supra note 47, at 84 (noting that most hearing parents of deaf children 
“invariably choose cochlear implants for their deaf child in order to facilitate his or her 
assimilation into the hearing world”). 
60 Karen Putz, ‘Sound and Fury’ Update:  A Family Comes Together Again, HANDS & 
VOICES (2005), http://www.handsandvoices.org/articles/misc/V8-4_soundfury.htm (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
61 Ramsey, Ethics and Culture, supra note 47, at 77–78. 
62 Id. at 78 (citation omitted). 
63 Id. at 79. 
64 Id. 
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Yet, . . . they find that they are not hearing people either.”65  As one 
undergraduate with implants reported, “it is emotionally exhausting to 
pretend to be a regular, hearing person.”66  It is only when deaf people 
who are raised with oral exclusive education learn to sign as adults that 
they develop strong self-esteem and experience the end of the 
psychological distress caused by the deprivation of their most natural 
and comfortable form of communication.67  For this reason, Deaf and 
disability activists urge parents who choose implants for their children to 
be sure to expose the children to Deaf culture and Deaf people 
throughout their lives, and to teach the children ASL from an early age.68 
Given the varied views on cochlear implants within the Deaf 
community itself, it is not surprising that the community focused on a 
more unifying issue in its advocacy for Lee Larson:  parental rights.  The 
activists and advocates reacted against the attempt to limit Larson’s 
parental rights.  Claudia Lee of the Deaf Community Advocacy Network 
explained that the case is about “the rights of parents and not whether we 
agree or disagree with cochlear implants or the choices that parents 
make.”69  In an amicus brief, MPAS argued the following: 
Michigan and federal constitutional and statutory law 
and practices honor and embrace the family unit as the 
centerpiece of the fabric of America.  Taking Ms. 
Larson’s right to make this core medical decision on 
behalf of her children would rip that fabric, and imperil 
her ability to reunify her family.70 
Moreover, MPAS argued “[a] decision allowing ‘outsiders,’ including 
this Court, to invade the family core by second-guessing parental 
decisions about how and by whom their children’s disabilities will be 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Gao, supra note 47, at 87. 
67 See, e.g., id. at 87–88 (“Upon meeting other deaf people and learning American Sign 
Language (ASL), Mark Drolsbaugh commented, ‘I am no longer ashamed of my deafness, I 
am proud of it.  I am proud of who I am, proud of what I’ve overcome, and proud of my 
culture.’”); Mary C. Holte & Maria C. Dinis, Self-Esteem Enhancement in Deaf and Hearing 
Women:  Success Stories, 146 AM. ANNALS DEAF, Oct. 2001, at 348, 352–53 (reporting on a 
study which revealed that deaf women were more likely to report as critical components in 
self-esteem enhancement both language and communication); Andrew Restuccia, Michael 
Schwartz:  Multiple Communication Methods Assist Deaf Law Professor in and Outside of the 
Classroom, DAILY ORANGE, Mar. 7, 2010, http://www.dailyorange.com/2.8691/michael-
schwartz-multiple-communication-methods-assist-deaf-law-professor-in-and-outside-of-
the-classroom-1.1237578. 
68 Gao, supra note 47, at 87. 
69 Montgomery, The Cochlear Implant Trial, supra note 2. 
70 Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 1, at 4. 
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treated takes a challenging family environment and threatens its very 
core.”71 
The focus of the disability and Deaf advocates involved in Lee 
Larson’s case on the right of parents of kids with disabilities to make 
medical decisions for their children is consistent with the official position 
of the National Association for the Deaf (“NAD”),72 a position that 
appears to represent the mainstream consensus within the Deaf and 
disability communities about cochlear implants.  The NAD recognizes 
the right of parents to make informed decisions on behalf of their 
children for or against implantation, but the NAD takes a cautious 
approach to affirmative choices to implant.  To ensure decisionmaking is 
truly informed, 
the NAD strongly urges physicians, audiologists, and 
allied professionals to refer parents to qualified experts 
in deafness and to other appropriate resources so that 
parents can make fully informed decisions—that is, 
decisions that incorporate far more than just the 
medical-surgical.  Such decisions involve language 
preferences and usage, educational placement and 
training opportunities, psychological and social 
development, and the use of technological devices and 
aids.73 
The NAD also recommends that implanted children be taught to use 
sign language at home, and that research be conducted to better 
understand the consequences in the long term for implanted and non-
implanted children.74 
IV.  VIEWS ON COCHLEAR IMPLANTATION FROM WITHIN BIOETHICS 
Although the case of Lee Larson’s boys mobilized the disability 
community, it appears to have gone largely unnoticed within bioethics.  
That is not to say that bioethicists have not considered the question of 
cochlear implants—they have—but they have not responded in public 
commentary or academic writing to the particular case.  The available 
bioethical commentary suggests that had Larson’s case received the 
                                                 
71 Id. 
72 NAD Position Statement on Cochlear Implants (2000), NAT’L ASS’N DEAF, 
http://www.nad.org/issues/technology/assistive-listening/cochlear-implants (last 
visited Jan. 7, 2011). 
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
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attention of bioethicists, her choice to refuse cochlear implants for her 
boys would have caused debate.  While many bioethics scholars and 
clinicians would support Larson’s choice as a matter of parental 
autonomy, others would agree with the state’s attorney and the guardian 
ad litem that Larson’s choice to refuse to implant her deaf children was 
so ethically problematic that intervention is or could be warranted. 
Within bioethics, as in medicine in general, respect for parental 
choice runs deep.  A bedrock principle of law and bioethics is that 
medical treatment must only be provided or withheld on the basis of a 
legally valid consent or refusal.75  To be legally valid, a consent or refusal 
of treatment must be informed and free.76  It must also be made by a 
person with decisionmaking capacity; that is, someone who is capable of 
understanding the proffered treatment, its goals, consequences, 
attendant risks, and the alternatives to treatment.77  Children lack the 
capacity to make their own healthcare decisions as a matter of law in 
most instances, so it is up to parents to decide whether to consent to 
treatment.  Bioethicists recognize that children should have an 
increasingly important voice in medical decisionmaking as they 
mature,78 but young children, like Lee Larson’s boys, cannot participate 
meaningfully in medical decisionmaking.  Therefore, a substitute 
decisionmaker is necessary, and because they are best able to assess the 
needs of a particular child, parents are the preferred decisionmakers for 
young children.79 
                                                 
75 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 
(Cal. 1972) (“[T]he patient’s right of self-decision is the measure of the physician’s duty to 
reveal.  That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses adequate 
information to enable an intelligent choice.  The scope of the physician’s communications 
to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is whatever 
information is material to the decision.  Thus the test for determining whether a potential 
peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient’s decision.”); see also TOM L. 
BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 99 (6th ed. 2008). 
76 Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972); Bouvia v. Sup. Ct., 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 303 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1986); State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 
P.2d 617, 621 (Nev. 1990). 
77 See generally Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
78 E.g., Rachel Bulford, Children Have Rights Too, 314 BMJ 1421, 1421–22 (1997); see 
generally Wilma C. Rossi et al., Child Assent and Parental Permission in Pediatric Research, 24 
THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 131 (2003). 
79 Am. Acad. of Pediatrics Comm. on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and 
Assent in Pediatric Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314 (Feb. 1995), available at http://www.cirp.org/ 
library/ethics/AAP/; Lainie Friedman Ross, Growth Attenuation by Commission and 
Omission May Be Ethically Justifiable in Children with Profound Disabilities, 161 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED., Apr. 2007, at 418; Erik Parens, Respecting Children with 
Disabilities—and Their Parents, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 22, 23 (2009) 
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As decisionmakers for children, parents are expected to weigh all 
relevant factors such as the risks, benefits, alternatives of treatment, a 
particular child’s pain tolerance, her medical, and social history, and 
proceed in accordance with whatever course is, all things considered, in 
the child’s best interests.  Deciding whether a particular course of 
treatment or non-treatment is in an individual child’s best interests 
requires an assessment of the relative importance of each factor.  
Clinicians and ethicists who place primary emphasis on the principle of 
respect for autonomy tend to conceive the assessment as a subjective one 
belonging to the parent, who is free to consider religious, familial, or 
other values in assessing treatment options.  In other words, the 
commitment to autonomy is expressed through value neutrality—an 
obligation not to interfere with the choice of another—regardless of 
whether the decisionmaker is the principal or a surrogate.  Except in the 
rare circumstance in which the decision will have devastating 
consequences for the child,80 the commitment to autonomy requires 
deference to parental choice.  Parents, after all, are in the best position to 
know what is best for a child.  Clinicians and ethicists will thus presume 
their choices to be in the best interests of the child. 
The commitment to parental autonomy expressed through value 
neutrality is evident in many legal cases in which courts have refused to 
second guess parental choices about a child’s medical care despite 
medical recommendations for a different course of action.81  Physician 
ethicist Douglas Diekema explains that the real question in medical cases 
involving children is not identifying which medical alternatives 
represent the best interests of the child but rather “identifying a harm 
threshold below which parental decisions will not be tolerated.”82  For 
many, that harm threshold is reached only when the refusal of treatment 
directly threatens the life of a child, such as in the case of the refusal of a 
simple blood transfusion.  When there are questions about medical 
efficacy of a particular treatment, or reasonable disagreement about the 
therapeutic value of an intervention, bioethics teaches that both 
intervention and avoidance of intervention are permissible alternatives.83 
                                                 
80 E.g., Custody of a Minor, 379 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1978) (ordering a child to 
undergo chemotherapy over the parents’ objections because the treatment had 
inconsequential side effects and would save the child from certain death within months). 
81 See sources cited supra note 44 and accompanying text (identifying cases where the 
court refrained from infringing on parents’ rights to make decisions for their children). 
82 Douglas S. Diekema, Parental Refusals of Medical Treatment:  The Harm Principle as 
Threshold for State Intervention, 25 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 243, 249 (2004). 
83 David Benatar, Non-Therapeutic Pediatric Interventions, in THE CAMBRIDGE TEXTBOOK OF 
BIOETHICS 127, 128 (Peter A. Singer & A. M. Viens, eds., 2008). 
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Cochlear implants certainly are not lifesaving treatment.  Although 
they are often touted as “miraculous,” the current state of implant 
technology is such that their use exposes a child to substantial risks, 
including infection, meningitis, and nerve damage, and their efficacy for 
prelingually deaf children is questionable at best.  For these reasons, the 
therapeutic value—the ability of the particular intervention to cure or 
prevent illness or impairment—is questionable.  Given the state of 
cochlear implant technology, their use in children would be deemed a 
matter of parental choice under this type of standard autonomy-based 
bioethical inquiry. 
Other bioethicists argue against parental choices for deafness.  
Australian bioethicist Julian Savulescu is most direct.  He argues that all 
deaf children for whom cochlear implants would be medically 
appropriate should be implanted: 
[W]hen a couple deny an existing child a cochlear 
implant, they deny that child the opportunity to hear 
speech, sound, music and to participate in the dominant 
culture, as well as being able to participate in a signing 
community.  They make that child worse off. 
 
This is analogous to a deaf couple with a hearing child 
who, wanting that child to be like them, deafen that 
child.  That would be child abuse. 
 
[D]enying a child a cochlear imp[lant] can have a similar 
outcome.  It is [as] neglectful as denying a child with an 
amputation a limb prosthesis, on the grounds that the 
child can walk well enough on crutches. 
 
In the case of competent adults, we can leave it to them 
to decide for themselves whether they have a cochlear 
implant or remain deaf, or even if they choose to become 
deaf.  I have vigorously defended the liberty [of] 
individuals to make controversial choices.  But when it 
comes to parents making choices for their children, there 
are two plausible principles.  Firstly, the intervention 
must plausibly be in the child’s interests.  In this case, 
the use of a cochlear implant is likely to make a child’s 
life go better than remaining deaf. 
 
Secondly, we should protect the child’s right to decide 
for herself.  In this case, being able to hear has one 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 3 [2011], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss3/10
2011] Hearing the Deaf:  Cochlear Implants 1265 
advantage over deafness.  The hearing can easily become 
deaf, while the deaf cannot easily become hearing later 
in life.  So a child given a cochlear implant could always 
choose to have it removed later in life, or turned off 
somehow.  A child, unhappy with the hearing culture, 
can reject it as an adult.  She can be made deaf.  But a 
deaf child cannot easily hear later in life. 
 
To my knowledge, no hearing adult has ever freely 
chosen to become deaf.  But it would be easy to achieve.  
So the cochlear implant affords the deaf child an extra 
option:  to be deaf or hearing later in life. 
 
Both respect for liberty/autonomy and beneficence 
argue in favour [of] making the provision of cochlear 
implants a legal requirement.84 
Savulescu’s argument reflects an understanding of the best interest 
inquiry as an objective one based upon standardized norms and 
common goals.  One of those goals, he argues, is preserving the child’s 
right to decide for herself. 
Ethicist Dena Davis shares Savulescu’s view that parents have a 
moral obligation to preserve future options for their children.  Adopting 
Joel Feinberg’s conception of a “child’s right to an open future,” Davis 
argues against deference to parental autonomy in favor of protecting a 
child’s potential autonomy.85  Davis and Feinberg divide rights into four 
categories.  First, there are rights that adults and children have in 
common, such as a right not to be killed.86  Second, there are rights 
which are generally possessed only by children and “childlike” adults, 
which derive from the child’s dependence on others for such basics as 
food, shelter, and protection.87  Feinberg calls these dependency rights, 
and they include the child’s right to be fed, nourished, and protected.  
Third, there are rights that can be exercised only by adults such as the 
                                                 
84 Julian Savulescu, Refusing Cochlear Implants:  Is It Child Neglect?, PRACTICAL ETHICS 
(July 13, 2009, 5:00 PM), http://www.practicalethicsnews.com/practicalethics/2009/07/ 
refusing-cochlear-implants-is-it-child-neglect.html (citation omitted). 
85 Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an Open Future, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 
549, 575 (1997). 
86 Joel Feinberg, The Child’s Right to an Open Future, in WILLIAM AIKEN, WHOSE CHILD?  
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 124, 125 (1980); see Philip 
Fetzer & Laurence D. Houlgate, Are Juveniles Still ‘Persons’ Under the United States 
Constitution?  A New Theory of Children’s Constitutional Rights, 5 INT’L J. CHILD. RTS. 319, 319 
(1997) (emphasizing the difference between having a right and enjoying it). 
87 Feinberg, supra note 86, at 125 (emphasis omitted). 
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free exercise of religion.88  Finally, Feinberg identifies a category of 
“rights-in-trust,” rights to be “saved for the child until he or she is an 
adult.”89  Rights-in-trust, Feinberg argues, include “anticipatory 
autonomy rights”90 which will eventually belong to the child when she 
becomes a “fully formed self-determining adult.”91  To elaborate, Dena 
Davis provides the following: 
An example is the right to choose one’s spouse.  
Children and teenagers lack the legal and social grounds 
on which to assert such a right, but clearly the child, 
when he or she attains adulthood, will have that right.  
Therefore, the child now has the right not to be 
irrevocably betrothed to someone.92 
According to Feinberg, rights-in-trust can be violated before the 
child is in a position to exercise them: 
The violating conduct guarantees now that when the 
child is an autonomous adult, certain key options will 
already be closed to him.  His right while he is still a 
child is to have these future options kept open until he is 
a fully formed self-determining adult capable of 
deciding among them.93 
Parents are morally obligated to protect a child’s rights-in-trust now so 
that the child can exercise them as an adult.  When a parent seeks to 
violate a right held in trust, Feinberg argues, the state should step in:  
“Children are not legally capable of defending their own future interests 
against present infringement by their parents, so that task must be 
performed for them.”94 
Applying the open futures approach to cases involving the use of 
genetic screening to ensure the birth of a deaf child, Davis argues that a 
                                                 
88 Id. 
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parental choice for deafness causes children moral harm.  Whether one 
views deafness as a disability or as a culture, Davis contends that a 
choice for deafness violates the child’s right to an open future: 
If deafness is a disability which substantially narrows a 
child’s career, marriage, and cultural options in the 
future, then deliberately creating a deaf child counts as a 
moral harm.  If Deafness is a culture, as Deaf activists 
assert, then deliberately creating a Deaf child who will 
have only limited options to move outside of that 
culture also counts as a moral harm.95 
Under Davis’s reasoning, no healthcare provider should acquiesce to a 
parental choice “that confines [a child] forever to a narrow group of 
people and a limited choice of careers.”96 
To be clear, Davis has not explicitly argued in favor of cochlear 
implants for all children.  It is quite possible that she would oppose any 
legal or other rule requiring cochlear implants, especially given the 
current state of the technology and its attendant physical risks.  That 
said, Davis’s argument would support mandates for cochlear implants if 
they were risk-free and uniformly successful.  She also clearly supports 
parents who choose to consent to implantation.97 
Indeed, with the exception of papers published by disability and 
Deaf scholars in bioethics publications, all the academic writing in 
bioethics suggests strong support for the right of parents to mitigate 
deafness with technology.  Neil Levy, for example, argues that no parent 
should be deprived the opportunity to use cochlear implants for a deaf 
child.98  Levy considers, but ultimately rejects, what he calls the disability 
argument, which posits any disadvantage caused by deafness should be 
addressed by altering society because that disadvantage is caused by 
society.  Although he acknowledges that much of the disadvantage 
caused by deafness could be addressed through social adjustments, Levy 
asserts that the Deaf are at least in part “naturally disabled.  They are, for 
example, disadvantaged by the fact that sound is widely relied upon as a 
means of alerting people to dangers, from car horns to sirens to fire 
alarms.”99  No social fix, including flashing lights on alarms, could fully 
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redress this disadvantage.  Levy also concedes that Deaf culture is real 
and valuable, and the cochlear implants threaten its continued existence.  
Nonetheless, he argues that hearing parents of deaf children have no 
special obligations to Deaf culture, which require them to commit their 
children to Deaf culture, something that is not required of deaf adults.  
Balancing the competing values, he concludes that 
whatever internal restrictions on the Deaf themselves 
might be justified by the need to preserve that culture, 
Deaf activists and their supporters have no right to 
impose the burdens of deafness on hearing-impaired 
children.  So long as Deaf culture survives, the costs 
associated with it will be relatively high, in that the deaf 
will remain an effectively isolated and underprivileged 
minority.100 
In sum, there is no consensus about the case of Lee Larson’s boys in 
bioethics.  The many ethicists who apply a value-neutral autonomy 
principle to support parental choice in medical decisionmaking would 
agree with disability experts that Lee Larson had the right to decide 
against cochlear implantation for her boys.  Others would disagree on 
the ground that a parent has a moral obligation to ensure an open future 
for a child.  The one issue about which bioethicists appear to have 
reached a consensus is that a parental choice to use cochlear implants is 
ethically and morally defensible.  That conclusion may be ultimately 
correct, but it does not justify indifference to the potential physical, 
psychological, and social harms carried with implantation. 
V.  BRIDGING THE DISCONNECT:  A DISABILITY-CONSCIOUS BIOETHICAL 
APPROACH TO COCHLEAR IMPLANTATION 
The foregoing discussion shows that although most disability 
experts and bioethicists ultimately support parental choice with respect 
to cochlear implants, their concerns are quite different.  As a whole, 
bioethics supports parental choice for cochlear implants but is concerned 
about decisions that encourage deafness, such as the decision to forgo 
the use of cochlear implants.  Deaf and disability experts view such 
interventions to ameliorate deafness as ethically fraught but contend 
(with a few exceptions) that ultimately parents may choose cochlear 
implantation so long as they are given accurate and complete 
information about their physical risks and are educated about the 
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potential negative social and psychological effects technological “fixes” 
have in the lives of children.  In my view, the position of Deaf and 
disability experts results from a more thorough bioethical analysis of the 
issues raised by cochlear implants than that found within mainstream 
bioethics. 
In arguing about cochlear implantation, bioethics experts focus on 
the reasons why children should not be denied implants.  Whether 
arguing for a right to choose implantation, or arguing for implantation 
for all, bioethicists worry about “confin[ing a child] forever to a narrow 
group of people,”101 or dooming a child to a life of disability.102  These 
arguments for implantation incorporate the medical understanding of 
disability and reflect the medical justification for implantation:  the 
benefits of “fixing” the child outweigh the medical risks of intervention. 
This focus on ensuring that children have access to cochlear 
implantation leaves gaps in bioethical analyses.  To be sure, there are 
strong, evidence-based objections within bioethics to the assertion that 
being deaf limits life options for children.103  And there are bioethicists 
who contest arguments that equate difference with dysfunction104 or 
otherwise make erroneous ablest assumptions about life with disability.  
For example, a British scholar who works at the intersection of disability 
and bioethics argues that “if bioethicists want to be able to say that the 
bad thing about disability, the experienced disadvantage of it, is sufficient 
grounds for morally serious medical interventions, then we need 
evidence that the disadvantage is as great as is claimed.”105  Nonetheless, 
the prevailing bioethical view is that cochlear implants are an ethically 
viable choice for children because they are medically efficacious, that are 
“likely to be safe and effective in providing benefit to the patient and 
improving her quality of life.”106  Having concluded that cochlear 
implants are safe and effective, bioethicists appear unconcerned or 
indifferent to parental decisions to use them in their deaf children. 
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The fact that cochlear implants can improve functionality should not 
end the ethical inquiry.  Just as there are medical benefits to the use of 
other technologies, such as respirators, the use of cochlear implants 
comes at a cost.  As demonstrated by Deaf and disability experts, people 
who have grown up with cochlear implants and oral-only language are 
likely to experience psychological trauma until they are exposed to sign 
language and Deaf culture.  That potential for isolation and 
psychological distress should not be overlooked in any conversation 
about the benefits of cochlear implants. 
The internal debate surrounding cochlear implants within the Deaf 
and disability communities is more nuanced.  Disability experts provide 
strong arguments that decisions to use technology to ameliorate deafness 
should be made with care and consultation with disability experts who 
can help parents understand the child’s need for visual language as a 
complement to whatever oral/aural skills the child will develop via the 
implants.  They advocate specific strategies for educating parents about 
cochlear implants and protecting the wellbeing of implanted and non-
implanted children.  These strategies seek to ensure truly informed 
decisionmaking and better outcomes for children whose parents elect 
implantation.107  They insist on continuing research and follow up on 
implanted children to ensure that implants are in fact benefiting 
children.108  These proposals are entirely consistent with the principles of 
informed consent and the practice of evidenced-based medicine, central 
to bioethical analysis. 
Because they contribute critical information and specialized 
knowledge about life with disability and the psychological and social 
costs of “cure,” Deaf and disability experts must be heard in debates 
surrounding cochlear implantation.  Their work shows that just as there 
are risks and benefits to raising a non-implanted child to be fluent in sign 
language and immersed in Deaf culture, there are benefits and risks to 
implantation.  Ultimately, it is the child’s parent or guardian who should 
weigh those benefits and risks and decide what is best for a child.  
Bioethicists could help that process by promoting more informed 
consent processes, better education about the disability and Deaf 
experience in medical schools, and engaging in empirical research in 
collaboration with other experts to generate more comprehensive data 
about the psychological and social effects of cochlear implantation.  That 
work will only be possible, however, when Deaf and disability experts 
are part of the bioethical conversation. 
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